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This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (‘subdebt’ thereafter) regulation 
can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. Under our proposal, 
investors buy the subdebt of a bank only if they receive favourable information 
about the bank, and the bank is subject to a regulatory examination if it fails to 
issue subdebt. By forcing banks to be examined when they are likely weak, 
subdebt regulation not only reduces the chance that managers of distressed banks 
can take value-destroying actions to benefit themselves, but may also encourage 
banks to lower asset risk. It shows that subdebt regulation and bank capital 
requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks’ moral hazard 
problems. It also suggests that to make subdebt regulation effective, regulators 
may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt, prohibit collusion 
between banks and subdebt investors, and require the subdebt to convert into the 
issuing bank’s equity when the government takes over or provides open assistance 
to the bank. 
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Pääomalainat, markkinakuri ja pankkien riskinotto 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 20/2011 
Yehning Chen – Iftekhar Hasan 




Tässä tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että pääomalainoihin perustuva viranomaissään-
tely − pääomalainojen sääntely − voi olla tehokasta pankkien liiallisen riskinoton 
hillitsemisen kannalta. Työssä ehdotetaan menettelyä, jonka mukaan sijoittajat 
myöntävät pankille pääomalainaa vain kun niiden käytettävissä oleva informaatio 
pankin tilasta puoltaa lainaamista. Toisaalta silloin, kun pankki ei onnistu laske-
maan liikkeeseen pääomalainaa, sääntelyviranomaisten pitäisi ehdotuksen mukaan 
tarkastaa pankki. Pakottamalla heikosti menestyvät pankit viranomaistarkastuk-
seen pääomalainojen sääntely pienentää mahdollisuutta, että ahdinkoon joutuneen 
pankin johto harjoittaa pankin markkina-arvoa alentavaa liiketoimintaa itse siitä 
hyötyäkseen. Pääomalainojen sääntely voi samalla vahvistaa pankin kannusteita 
vähentää omaisuusriskejä. Työssä argumentoidaan myös, että pääomalainojen 
sääntelyä ja pankkien pääomavaatimuksia voidaan käyttää toisiaan täydentävästi 
pyrittäessä hallitsemaan epäsymmetrisestä informaatiosta aiheutuvia pankkien 
kannustinongelmia. Pääomalainoihin perustuvan sääntelyn tehostamiseksi näiden 
lainojen koroille olisi ehkä välttämätöntä asettaa katto, millä pyrittäisiin estämään 
pankkien ja pääomalainoittajien salainen liittoutuminen. Valvonta- ja sääntely-
viranomaisten tulisi myös vaatia pääomalainojen muuntamista niitä myyvien 
pankkien osakepääomaksi silloin, kun julkinen valta ottaa pankin vastuulleen tai 
myöntää avointa tukea sille. 
 
Avainsanat: pääomalainojen sääntely, pankkien pääomien sääntely, markkinakuri, 
piilotettu informaatio ja kannustinongelma, ehdollinen pääomatodistus 
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1. Introduction 
  Ensuring that banks behave prudently is a main purpose of bank regulation. Among the 
alternatives that regulators can use, capital requirements have become the main mechanism for 
enforcing prudential regulation after the passage of the Basel Accord in 1988. However, capital 
regulation alone is not a perfect solution to the banks’ moral hazard problems. Because the majority of 
banks’ assets are opaque and do not have liquid market prices, capital ratios are usually lagging 
indicators of banks’ financial health.
1 Also, as shown in Hellmann et al. (2000), because capital is a 
costly funding source, a strict bank capital requirement may worsen the banks’ moral hazard problems 
through reducing their franchise values. 
Given the limitations of bank capital regulation, other mechanisms should be employed to 
enhance prudential regulation. In this paper, we study the feasibility of inducing investors of the banks’ 
subordinated debt (subdebt thereafter) to monitor banks. Subdebt regulation has become a popular 
idea among regulators and academics for years. Various proposals for implementing subdebt 
regulation have been advocated and widely discussed.
2 These proposals suggest that subdebt 
regulation may create both direct and indirect disciplining effects. For direct discipline, because banks 
with higher asset risk have to pay higher interest rates on subdebt, subdebt regulation can induce banks 
to lower asset risk in order to reduce interest payments. Indirect discipline means that regulators can 
take prompt corrective actions against banks with high subdebt yields or banks unable to roll over 
subdebt. These corrective actions not only prevent further losses of problem banks, but also stop bank 
managers from pursuing unsound risk. 
                                                 
1  The financial crisis of 2008-2009 provides good examples to illustrate this point. According to Duffie (2009), 
Citibank’s tier-1 capital ratio never fell below 7% during the financial crisis, and was 11.8% in December 2008, 
when it was in a very poor financial condition. 
2  Appendix A of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2000) contains a nice review of the 
subdebt proposals. Also see Evanoff and Wall (2001, 2002), Calomiris (1999), Flannery (2001), Flannery and 
Sorescu (1996), Lang and Robertson (2002), and Evanloff and Jagtiani (2004) for discussions of proposals for 
implementing subdebt regulation.   8
  However, there are concerns about the effectiveness of subdebt regulation and how it should be 
implemented. Some worry that issuing public subdebt is too costly for small banks; some suggest that 
subdebt regulations will not work if the government cannot commit not to bail out subdebt holders or 
if bank insiders can buy the subdebt. Moreover, even though many empirical papers find that subdebt 
spreads are informative about the issuing banks’ financial conditions,
3  Evanoff and Wall (2001, 2002) 
point out that the information implied by subdebt spreads may be too noisy to serve as triggers of 
corrective actions. 
  Another concern about subdebt regulation is the “double endogeneity problem” discussed in 
Birchler and Facchinetti (2007 and Bond et al. (2009), who argue that regulations using market prices 
as the triggers of regulatory actions may fail if market participants believe that they would work.
4￿
Blum (2002) also shows that, when a bank cannot pre-commit the level of its asset risk, requiring it to 
issue subdebt will result in higher bank risk through increasing the bank’s debt burden. Finally, 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Flannery (2001) suggest that investors are good at evaluating banks’ 
risk, but poor in influencing the banks’ behavior. If this is true, the direct disciplining effect of subdebt 
will be limited. 
  This paper establishes a model to investigate whether subdebt regulation can be an effective 
mechanism for disciplining banks. In the model, a bank is owned and controlled by its manager. The 
manager determines the level of the bank’s asset risk, and his choice of risk is unobservable to others. 
Two types of moral hazard problems may arise. First, as a debtor, the bank’s manager may pursue 
                                                 
3  See Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Flannery (2001), Jagtiani, Kaufman, and Lemieux (2000), Morgan and 
Stiroh (2001), Hancock and Kwast (2001), Sironi (2001a, b), and Evanoff and Wall (2001, 2002). However, 
there are some exceptions. Avery, Belton, and Goldberg (1988) and Gorton and Santomero (1990) find that 
subdebt spreads and the bank risk implied by the spreads are not related to accounting measures of bank risk. 
Also, Krishnan, Pitchken, and Thomson (2005) find that changes in credit spreads of subdebts do not reflect 
changes in firm-specific risks. 
4  If investors believe that the regulation using subdebt spreads as the triggers of corrective actions is effective, 
they will expect risky banks with high subdebt spreads to be timely disciplined and become safe. As a result, 
they will not require high yields on these banks, so the expected corrective actions may not be triggered. It can 
be shown that there may be no equilibrium in which this regulation can effectively discipline banks.   9
excessive risk when determining asset risk. Second, once the bank is likely to fail, the bank manager 
may take value-destroying actions, such as gambling for resurrection or tunneling bank resources into 
his own pocket, to benefit himself at the expense of depositors and deposit insurance funds. 
The bank is supervised by the government, which can impose capital requirements and subdebt 
regulation. Both capital and subdebt are costly funding sources: the required rates of return for them 
are higher than that for deposits. The bank manager has to put part of his own wealth in the bank as 
bank capital. Also, the bank is required to issue short-term subdebt, and the government can impose a 
cap on the interest rate of the debt. If the bank fails to issue subdebt, it will be subject to a costly 
regulatory examination. In case the examination reveals that the bank is weak, the government takes 
over the bank and the banker is deprived of the opportunity to take value-destroying actions. 
Under this setting, we show that subdebt regulation can complement bank capital regulation for 
disciplining banks. The natures of these two regulations are different. While capital regulation reduces 
the bank shareholders’ incentives to seek risk, subdebt regulation induces outsiders who cannot enjoy 
the upside gains of the banks’ profits to monitor banks. Even though a sufficiently high capital 
requirement can eliminate all the banks’ moral hazard problems, it may be too costly, either in terms of 
social welfare or to the banker. Subdebt regulation can help in this case. Under appropriate design, 
investors will buy the debt only if they receive favorable information about the bank. By forcing the 
bank to be examined when it is likely weak, the subdebt requirement reduces the chance that the bank 
manager can engage in value-destroying actions when the bank is in poor financial conditions. As will 
be shown, this effect lowers the bank manager’s ex ante incentive to pursue risk if regulatory 
forbearance is common and/or if bank capital ratio cannot timely reflect the financial conditions of 
banks. In these cases, the bank capital requirement can be relaxed when subdebt regulation is imposed. 
The subdebt regulation proposed in this paper has several interesting features. First, regulatory 
actions are triggered by the bank’s failure to issue subdebt rather than high secondary market subdebt   10
yields. Because of this feature, the subdebt need not be public,
5  and the regulation does not suffer the 
double endogeneity problem. Second, the bank’s violation of the subdebt requirement is followed by a 
regulatory examination, so both market information and supervisory information are used.
6 Since 
subdebt regulation just serves as a trap wire to trigger a regulatory examination, it may still work even 
if the information of subdebt investors is not very precise. 
Third, in our proposal the government can impose ceilings on interest rates of subdebt. As will be 
seen, these ceilings may be necessary to prevent banks from bribing subdebt investors not to monitor 
banks. Fourth, to avoid a government bailout of subdebt investors, the subdebt in our proposal has a 
conversion feature: it converts into the issuing bank’s equity at a predetermined price if the 
government takes over or provides open assistance to the bank. The conversion price is set high so that 
subdebt investors will suffer losses when conversion occurs. The fear of losses will motivate subdebt 
investors to monitor banks. Finally, the disciplining mechanism in our paper is indirect rather than 
direct discipline. That is, investors evaluate the subdebt issued by the bank, and regulators take the 
corrective actions. In this sense, it is consistent with the idea in Flannery (2001) that investors have a 
comparative advantage in monitoring, while supervisors have a comparative advantage in influencing. 
In the literature, several articles study how to construct debt contracts to induce optimal 
monitoring from creditors. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) demonstrate that the first-come, first-served 
rule can be part of the optimal banking contract that induces depositors to monitor banks. Chen (1999) 
and Chen and Hasan (2006) discuss how to implement efficient depositor discipline through designing 
the deposit insurance system. Rajan and Winton (1995) show that covenants and collateral can 
                                                 
5  Calomiris (1999) suggests that subdebt may take the form of uninsured time deposits held by other banks. In 
this case, banks are monitored by peer banks. As shown in Furfine (2001), banks can effectively monitor other 
banks in the overnight federal funds markets. 
6  The proposals in Evanoff and Wall (2002) and Hart and Zingales (2009) also have this feature. Evanoff and 
Wall propose that prompt corrective actions imposed on banks that violate subdebt regulation can be waived if 
regulators provide strong evidence that the banks are indeed financially strong. Hart and Zingales suggest that 
regulators take a stress test on a large financial institution if the institution’s credit default swap price rises above 
a critical threshold. According to the test results, regulators either announce that the financial institution is safe, 
or take corrective actions against it.   11
enhance the banks’ incentives to monitor borrowers. Carletti (2004) and Carletti et al. (2007) suggest 
that multiple-bank lending may be the optimal arrangement when the banks’ monitoring efforts are 
unobservable. Park (2000) proposes that monitoring creditors should hold senior claims.   
Similar to these papers, our paper also investigates how to arrange debt contracts to induce creditor 
monitoring. In terms of how to discipline banks, our model extends Calomiris and Kahn’s work in two 
ways. First, we endogenize the bank manager’s choice of risk to see how subdebt regulation affects his 
incentives to pursue risk. Second, we study subdebt holder discipline rather than depositor discipline. 
In contrast to Park (2000), we show that subdebt holders will monitor even if their claims are junior. 
The merit of capital requirements in reducing the banks’ risk-taking incentives has been 
documented in various papers, including Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Chiesa (2001, 2008), 
Hellmann et al. (2000), Santos (1999), and Acharya (2003). Hellmann et al. suggest that bank capital 
regulation alone cannot solve the banks’ risk-taking problems, so other types of regulation, such as 
interest rate ceilings, are needed. Complementing their work, we show that subdebt regulation is 
valuable even if bank capital requirements have been implemented. 
Blum (2002) and Niu (2008) also study how subdebt regulation affects bank risk. Both papers 
discuss the direct discipline effect of subdebt, but they reach very different conclusions. While Blum 
(2002) proposes that the subdebt requirement will result in higher bank risk through increasing the 
bank’s debt burden, Niu (2008) suggests that subdebt regulation can induce banks to lower interest 
rates on deposits, thus reduce their risk-seeking incentives.
7 Unlike these papers, the focus of our 
paper is the indirect rather than direct discipline effect of subdebt. We investigate the feasibility of 
imposing subdebt regulation to extract valuable information from investors, and use this information 
to prevent financially weak banks from taking value-destroying actions. Neither Blum (2002) nor Niu 
(2008) models private information of subdebt investors and the value-destroying actions of bank 
                                                 
7  In Niu (2008), a bank sets the deposit rate before the interest rate of subdebt is determined. If the bank sets the 
interest rate of deposits high, subdebt investors will infer that the bank’s debt burden and asset risk will be high, 
so they will require a high interest rate on subdebt.   12
managers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes the 
case where only capital requirements are used to deal with the banks’ moral hazard problems. 
Assuming that capital regulation has already been in place, Section 4 studies how the use of subdebt 
regulation may affect bank risk. Section 5 investigates the welfare effects of subdebt regulation. 
Section 6 discusses practical concerns for implementing subdebt regulation and the connection 
between our proposal and the proposals that require banks to issue contingent capital certificates. 
Concluding remarks are in Section 7. 
 
2. The Model 
  Consider a three-period (dates 0, 1, and 2) model in which the risk-free interest rate is zero. At 
date 0, a banker has an opportunity to establish a bank. If established, the bank issues securities to 
finance an investment project. The banker can choose between two exclusive projects, projects S (safe) 
and R (risky). For i = S, R, undertaking project i requires one dollar invested at date 0, and the project 
matures at date 2. Project i will either succeed or fail. At date 0, it is common knowledge that project i 
will succeed with probability pi, and will fail with probability 1 – pi. At date 2, project i yields Xi if it 
succeeds, and yields Y if it fails, where XR > XS > 1 > Y, and
8 
pS X S + (1 – pS) Y > 1 > pR X R + (1 – pR) Y.                      ( 1 )  
Equation (1) implies that project R should not be undertaken. Define 
R S
R R S S
p p




≡ ,                                                 ( 2 )  
where G is a proxy for the relative attractiveness of project S to the banker compared to project R.
9 
                                                 
8  There are other ways to model the bank’s risk-taking behavior. For example, see Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 
(2006, 2009). Our main results will still hold if we model the bank’s risk-taking behavior according to their 
models. 
9  Intuitively, project S is more attractive than project R to the banker if it generates a higher expected cash flow   13
The higher the G, the more attractive is project S. By equation (1), we know that G is greater than Y. 
The banker’s choice of project is unobservable to any other party. Without loss of generality, assume 
that he will choose project S if he is indifferent between the two projects. 
At date 2, after the project’s cash flow is realized and before depositors and subdebt investors are 
paid, the banker can take a value-destroying action to benefit himself at the expense of others. This 
assumption reflects the moral hazard problems of distressed banks. As the chance that a weak bank 
will recover dwindles, its managers have strong incentives to either gamble for resurrection, or grab 
something for themselves before the bank fails. This problem is serious in the real world. As many 
authors point out, during the U.S. Savings and Loan Crisis of 1980s zombie savings and loan 
associations with negative economic values took advantage of deregulation to pursue high risk, and 
their risk-taking behavior aggravated the social costs of the crisis.
10 The concern for this problem 
motivates many countries, including the United States, to require regulators to take prompt corrective 
actions when banks’ financial conditions deteriorate. 
To simplify the exposition, suppose that the value-destroying action the banker takes is 
absconding with the money at the bank. Whether the project succeeds or not, if the banker absconds, 
he receives b, and nothing is left for other claimholders, where b is a constant with 0 < b < Y.
11 The 
assumption that the banker can take the money and run is not critical. Our main qualitative results will 
hold if we assume that the banker takes other types of value-destroying actions. 
Under this setting, two types of moral hazard problems may arise. First, if debt financing is used, 
the banker may have excessive incentives to pursue risk. In our model, project R is riskier than project 
S, so the banker may prefer project R to project S even if the expected return of project R is negative. 
Second, the banker may abscond at date 2. We will investigate how bank capital and subdebt 
                                                                                                                                                          
(that is, pS XS – pR XR – (pS – pR) Y becomes larger) or if it becomes riskier (that is, pS – pR becomes smaller). 
10  For a more detailed discussion, see Cole et al. (1995) and Kane (1989). 
11  The assumption that the value of b is independent of whether the project succeeds is not critical. Our results 
will still hold if the bank receives more from absconding when the project succeeds.   14
regulations can alleviate these problems. 
The banker maximizes expected profits. At date 0, he establishes a bank and becomes its sole 
shareholder if his payoff from doing so is non-negative. The bank is subject to capital regulation: for 
each dollar invested by the bank, the banker has to put k dollars of his own wealth in the bank as bank 
capital,
12 where  0 < k < 1. The bank issues deposits to raise the remaining amount for the investment. 
Deposits are fully insured by the government, so under the zero risk-free rate assumption, depositors 
are willing to deposit as long as the return form depositing is non-negative. 
Following Hellmann et al. (2000), we assume that bank capital is a costly funding source, and the 
opportunity cost of bank capital from dates 0 to 2 is 1 + rk, where rk > 0. In other words, rk is the 
required rate of return for bank capital for two dates. There are several possible reasons for why bank 
capital is more expensive than deposits. First, bank capital does not have the tax shield of debt. Second, 
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) suggest that a higher capital ratio gives bank management more 
discretion, which worsens the agency problems between bank management and shareholders. Third, 
using a general equilibrium framework, Gorton and Winton (1997) show that the adverse selection 
problem in equity trading creates a “lemons cost”, which makes bank equity more expensive than 
deposits. Finally, as argued in Hellmann et al. (2000), the fact that regulators do not use capital 
regulation to eliminate all the moral hazard problems in banking implies that bank capital is costly. If 
capital were not costly, regulators would simply require banks to hold sufficient capital to ensure that 
banks behave prudently. 
For simplicity, assume that the government does not charge any deposit insurance premium from 
the bank. If deposit insurance could be risk-based and fairly priced, the banking industry’s moral 
hazard problems would be reduced because risk-chasing banks would be punished by high deposit 
insurance premiums. However, in the real world deposit insurance premiums are usually underpriced. 
                                                 
12  We assume that the banker does not face any wealth constraint. If the banker has no wealth and sells the 
bank’s equity to investors, our results will still hold as long as he maximizes welfare of all the shareholders.   15
More importantly, they are often not very sensitive to bank risk because it is difficult to find precise 
and objective proxies for bank risk. Our assumptions about deposit insurance reflect these 
observations. 
In addition to the capital requirement, the government may also implement subdebt regulation. 
Subdebt is junior to deposits, and is not covered by deposit insurance. The regulation requires the bank 
to raise α dollars at date 1 by issuing subdebt that matures at date 2, where α is an exogenous 
parameter with 0 < α < 1 – k. We will discuss the case where α is endogenized in Section 5. The 
regulation also requires that deposits of α dollars mature at date 1, and the remaining deposits mature 
at date 2, so the proceeds from issuing subdebt are used to replace the maturing deposits.
13  
Because subdebt is junior to deposits and it may convert into the issuing bank’s equity under our 
proposal, investors may require a higher rate of return on subdebt. Therefore, we assume that subdebt 
is a costly funding source, and the opportunity cost of subdebt for one date is 1 + rSD, where rSD is 
strictly positive.
14 
We also assume that the banker cannot collude with subdebt investors, and the government is not 
allowed to bail out subdebt investors under any circumstance. In Section 6, we will discuss how the 
collusion between the banker and subdebt investors and a possible government bailout of subdebt 
investors will affect the effectiveness of subdebt regulation. 
There are many investors who may buy the subdebt, and they are willing to invest in subdebt as 
long as the expected profit from investing is non-negative. At date 1, investors can receive a signal, s, 
about the bank’s project at a cost cI. The signal is not verifiable in courts, and its value is either H or L. 
If the bank’s project will succeed, s = H with probability q and s = L with probability 1 – q; if the 
project will fail, s = H with probability 1 – q and s = L with probability q, where 0.5 < q < 1 and q 
                                                 
13  The assumption that subdebt is required only at date 1 simplifies the exposition without changing our results. 
All of our qualitative results hold if the bank is also required to issue subdebt at date 0.   
14 The assumption that subdebt is expensive is not critical. All of our main results will hold if rSD = 0. In fact, 
subdebt regulation is more likely to be welfare improving if rSD becomes lower.   16
represents the precision of the signal. For simplicity, assume that all the investors who spend cI receive 
the same signal. 
Regulatory actions are tied to the subdebt requirement. The bank will be examined by a regulator 
if it cannot successfully issue subdebt at date 1. After the examination, the regulator learns perfectly 
whether the bank’s project will succeed. He allows the bank to be reopened if the project will succeed. 
The reopened bank can issue insured deposits to repay the deposits that mature at date 1.
15 If the 
bank’s project will fail, the regulator will take over the bank. The takeover is beneficial: once the bank 
is taken over, the banker no longer has the opportunity to abscond at date 2.
16 
The regulatory examination is costly: whether the bank’s project will succeed or not, the 
examination reduces the project’s date-2 cash flow by cM. That is, for i = S, R, if the banker undertakes 
project i and the bank is examined, the project’s date-2 cash flow becomes Xi – cM if it succeeds, and 
becomes Y – cM if it fails. Obviously, if cM is sufficiently low, the regulator should always examine the 
bank at date 1. We assume that always having the bank examined at date 1 is not socially optimal. In 
the next section, we will provide a condition under which this assumption holds. 
For issuing subdebt, at date 1 the bank randomly chooses an investor, offering to sell him the 
subdebt for α dollars and pay him back D dollars at date 2, where D is determined by the banker.
17 
This investor first decides whether to acquire s; he then considers whether to buy the subdebt given the 
information he has.
18  If the investor rejects the offer, the bank is examined by a regulator. 
Following Calomiris (1997, 1999), we assume that the government can impose a cap on D, 
                                                 
15  As will be shown, the banker will not abscond with money when the project succeeds. Since the project of the 
reopened bank always succeeds, there is no need to impose subdebt regulation on it. 
16 We assume that the banker can abscond only at date 2 but not at date 1. Subdebt regulation will not work if 
the banker can always abscond at date 1 before the regulator takes over the bank. Our baseline assumption is that 
the information extracted from subdebt regulation is timely enough (at least sometimes) to stop managers of 
weak banks from taking value-destroying actions. 
17  For simplicity, we assume that the subdebt is bought by only one investor. If the subdebt is bought by multiple 
investors, the main results of the paper will remain the same qualitatively as long as all the investors receive the 
same signal and investors cannot observe the others’ decisions when they make decisions. 
18  If the investor acquires s, his investment decision is based on s and his conjecture on which project the banker 
undertakes. If he does not acquire s, his decision is based only on his conjecture on the banker’s project choice.   17
which is equivalent to a cap on the interest rate of subdebt because the interest rate is equal to D/α – 1. 
As will be seen, such a cap may be necessary for subdebt regulation to work. To reflect the fact that a 
bank’s franchise value will be damaged when it fails, suppose that the banker will lose franchise value 
F if the bank is either taken over by the regulator at date 1 or is unable to pay off its debts at date 2, 
where F > 0.
19 Assume  that 
b < F < 1 + b – G.                                           ( 3 )  
As will be shown, equation (3) implies that the banker will choose project R if no regulation is 
imposed. Note that, to avoid losing the franchise value, the banker may have the incentive to inject his 
own wealth into the bank at date 2 to repay depositors and the subdebt investor if there is not enough 
money at the bank. 
When designing subdebt regulation, we make two important assumptions about the government. 
First, it cannot spend cI to acquire the signal s and take the right actions according to s.
20 If the 
government could do so, there would be no need to use subdebt regulation to extract the information 
of investors. This assumption is consistent with the idea in Flannery (2001) that investors have an 
advantage over regulators in monitoring. It also reflects the fact that, to avoid pressures from interest 
groups or lobbyists, regulators are usually reluctant to take actions against a bank unless there is hard 
evidence (rather than non-verifiable information) showing that the bank is in weak financial positions. 
Second, the government can commit itself to take the right corrective actions once the bank fails to 
issue subdebt. This assumption is reasonable because the bank’s violation of the subdebt requirement 
sends a strong message to the public that the bank may be in trouble. Even if the government’s 
incentives are distorted against taking over weak banks, the costs and the risk for it to cover up the 
problem will be high once the public has already learned the problem. By making weak banks more 
                                                 
19  One interpretation of the franchise value F is that it is the sum of the future profits that the bank can earn if it 
does not fail. Note that F will not be incurred if the bank is examined and reopened. 
20 Signal  s contains information about whether the bank’s project will succeed. Because both projects may either 
succeed or fail, the signal is still valuable to the government even if the government can infer the banker’s 
project choice from the model parameters.     18
visible to the public, subdebt regulation forces the government to take timely corrective actions against 
these banks. 
For simplicity, we assume that the bank behaves as a monopolist when it issues deposits and 
subdebt.
21 Under this assumption, it will offer zero interest rate to depositors. Also, to simplify the 
exposition, we only consider cases that satisfy the following two conditions. First, the bank is able to 
pay off all the debts when its project succeeds, that is,
22 
XS ≥ Max{1 – k – α + D, 1 – k + cM}. 
Second, Y < 1 – k – α, which implies both the banker and the subdebt investor receive nothing if the 
bank’s project fails and the banker neither absconds with money nor injects funds into the bank. 
The time line of the model is shown in the following figure. 
[Please insert the Figure here] 
 
3. Disciplining the Bank by Capital Requirements 
In this section, we assume that the government relies only on capital requirements, but not 
subdebt regulation, to deal with the bank’s moral hazard problems, so α = 0. We solve the game 
backwards. First consider the banker’s decision on whether to abscond at date 2. For i = S, R, suppose 
the banker chooses project i at date 0. If the project succeeds, his payoffs for absconding and not 
absconding are b – F – (1 + rk) k and Xi – (1 – k) – (1 + rk) k, respectively. Because b < F and Xi > 1 – 
                                                 
21 As well documented in the literature, market structures have significant impacts on the banks’ behavior (for 
example, see Boyd and Nicolo (2005), Hellmann et al. (2000), and Wagner (2010)). However, since the focus of 
our paper is designing subdebt regulation to induce investors to monitor banks, the intuitions of the paper are not 
related to the structures of the deposit or subdebt markets. If depositors or subdebt investors have bargaining 
power, our main results will still hold qualitatively as long as the signal that subdebt investors receive contains 
information about bank risk. Assuming a monopolistic bank does greatly simplify our analysis of the banker’s 
and the subdebt investors’ decisions. 
22  If the bank successfully issues subdebt and its project succeeds, at date 2 it pays 1 – k – α dollars to depositors, 
and pays D to the subdebt investor. The cash flow of the project is at least Xi in this case. If the bank is taken 
over by the regulator and its project succeeds, at date 2 it pays 1 – k dollars to depositors and the cash flow 
generated by the project is Xi – cM. Given that XR > XS, if XS > Max{1 – k – α + D, 1 – k + cM}, the bank can 
always pay off its deposits and subdebt.   19
k, the banker will not abscond if the project succeeds. 
Alternatively, if the project fails, the banker’s payoff for absconding is b – F – (1 + rk) k. In case 
he does not take the money and run, he may either do nothing or inject his own wealth into the bank to 
repay depositors. For the banker, the advantage of the latter choice is to keep the franchise value. His 
payoff is – F – (1 + rk) k if he does nothing, and is Y – (1 – k) – (1 + rk) k if he injects funds into the 
bank.
23  Therefore, the banker will inject funds if 
k  ≥ k 2  ≡ 1 + b – F – Y,                                         ( 4 )  
and will abscond otherwise. By (3) and the fact that Y < G, k2 is strictly positive. 
  Now consider the banker’s project choice at date 0. From the above discussion, for i = S, R, the 
banker’s payoff for choosing project i is
24 
Πk(i, k) ≡ p i (Xi –1+k) + (1–pi) max{b–F, Y–1+k} – (1+rk)k.            ( 5 )  
Given k, the banker will choose project S if and only if Πk(S, k) ≥ Πk(R, k). The following proposition 
documents the banker’s choices at date 0 and date 2. The proofs of all the propositions and the lemma 
are in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that only capital regulation is imposed, and that the banker establishes the 
bank at date 0. 
(a)  If k < k1, the banker chooses project R, and will abscond with money when the project fails, where 
k1  ≡ 1 + b – F – G                                              ( 6 )  
is strictly positive, and is smaller than k2. 
                                                 
23  The banker will offer zero interest rate to depositors, so he pays 1 – k dollars to depositors at date 2. Also, 
because the game ends right after the banker injects funds into the bank, we assume that the required rate of 
return for the money he injects into the bank is zero. 
24  Equation (5) can be explained as follows. If the project succeeds, the banker’s payoff is Xi –1+k before 
deducting the cost of bank capital. If the project fails, the banker can choose between absconding and injecting 
funds to pay off the deposits. Before deducting the cost of bank capital, his payoff is b – F if he absconds and is 
Y – 1 – k if he injects funds. The banker will choose the alternative that gives him the higher payoff.   20
(b) If k1 ≤ k < k2, the banker chooses project S, and will abscond with money when the project fails. 
(c)  If k ≥ k2, the banker chooses project S, and will inject funds to the bank when the project fails. 
 
The results in Proposition 1 are intuitive. By reducing the bank’s debt burden from one dollar to 
1 – k dollars, bank capital regulation lowers the banker’s incentives to choose project R as well as his 
incentives to take the value-destroying action when the project fails. If k ≥ k2, the capital requirement 
is so high that the bank’s moral hazard problems totally disappear. If k1 ≤ k < k2, capital regulation will 
induce the banker to choose project S, but cannot stop him from absconding when the project fails. If k 
< k1, capital regulation is not useful for alleviating the bank’s moral hazard problems. From the result 
that k1 > 0, the banker will choose project R if no bank regulation is imposed, which means some form 
of bank regulation is necessary in our model. 
We next investigate the optimal amount of bank capital for a welfare-maximizing government. 
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To simplify the exposition, in the rest of the paper we will focus on the case where Πk(S, k1) ≥ 0 
and Wk(k1) ≥ 0, which means using capital requirements to reduce bank risk is a feasible choice 
for the government. 
By (7), obviously the government should set k equal to either k1 or k2. The following lemma 
states the optimal k for the government when only bank capital regulation is imposed. 
                                                 
25  Neglecting the costs of bank capital, the net present value of the bank’s project is pS XS + (1 – pS) Y – 1 if k ≥ 
k2, and is pS XS + (1 – pS) (b – F) – 1 if k1 ≤ k < k2. The k rk is the extra cost incurred when bank capital is used.   
26 In equation (7), whether the bank’s loss of franchise value should be counted as a social loss is debatable. It 
should be counted if F represents the economic rents from the bank’s better lending technology or its 
relationship with borrowers. It should not be counted if F just reflects the value of a bank license, and a new 
bank will be set up to replace the failed one. As will be shown in Section 5, the condition under which subdebt 
regulation can improve welfare does not depend on F. Therefore, our results will still hold if the bank’s loss of 
franchise value is not regarded as a social loss.   21
 
The Lemma. Suppose that only capital regulation is imposed on the bank. The optimal k for the 
government is k2 if Πk(S, k2) ≥ 0 and 
(k2 – k1) rk  ≤ (1 – pS)(Y – b),                                      ( 8 )  
and is k1 otherwise. 
 
  The lemma says that the government should completely eliminate the bank’s moral hazard 
problems by setting k equal to k2 if this requirement does not prevent the banker from establishing the 
bank, and the social gain from solving the banker’s absconding problem (which is (1 – pS)(Y – b)) 
outweighs the extra capital cost incurred (which is (k2 – k1) rk). Although setting k = k2 can completely 
deter the bank’s moral hazard problems, doing so may be too costly in terms of welfare if (8) fails to 
hold, and may even be an infeasible choice for the government if Πk(S, k2) < 0. The government 
should set k equal to k1 in these cases. 
  When the government imposes capital regulation, one alternative it can choose is to require the 
regulator to always examine the bank at date 1, so the banker cannot steal money from the bank. 
Obviously, this choice will not be attractive to the government if cM is sufficiently high. It can be 
verified that if 
cM > (1 – pS) (Y – b) + k1 r k,                                     ( 9 )  
then always having the bank examined is strictly dominated by capital regulation with k = k1.
27 In  the 
rest of the paper, we assume that (9) holds, so always having the bank examined is not optimal for the 
                                                 
27  Compared to imposing capital regulation with k = k1, always having the bank examined has two merits. One 
is the gain from deterring the banker’s absconding problem, which equals (1 – pS) (Y – b). The other is the 
savings from reduction in bank capital used, which is no larger than k1 r k. These benefits are shown in the 
right-hand-side of (9). If (9) holds, the cost of the examination exceeds its benefits. Note that for the comparison, 
we suppose that when the bank is always examined, the banker will choose project S even if k = 0. If this 
assumption is violated, the government has to set k > 0 to induce the bank to choose project S. In this case, the 
savings from reduction in bank capital are smaller than k1 rk, which makes always having the bank examined at 
date 1 even less attractive.   22
government. 
 
4. The Role of Subdebt Requirements in Prudential Regulation 
This section investigates the case where both capital and subdebt requirements are implemented. 
Assume that k < k2. If k ≥ k2, the bank’s moral hazard problems are completely solved by bank capital 
regulation, and there would be no role for subdebt regulation to play. The game is solved backwards. 
First consider what happens after the investor offered to buy the subdebt has made his decisions. In 
case he buys the debt, the banker considers whether to abscond with money at date 2. By the 
discussions in the previous section and the assumption k < k2, he will not abscond if the project 
succeeds, and will if the project fails. 
  Now suppose the investor refuses to buy the debt at date 1. In this case, the bank is examined, 
and is reopened if and only if the project will succeed. If the bank is reopened, the banker will not 
abscond at date 2 because his payoff from absconding is strictly lower.
28  If the bank is taken over, the 
banker’s date-2 payoff is – F – (1+rk) k. 
  Next consider the investor’s decisions when he is invited to buy the subdebt. Because the 
investor does not observe the banker’s project choice, he has to form conjecture on the banker’s action. 
Suppose the investor believes that the banker undertakes project j. Given the bank’s offer, he has three 
choices. First, he can buy the debt without acquiring s. Second, he can acquire s and buy the debt if 
and only if s = H.
29 Third, he can neither acquire s nor buy the debt. His payoffs from these choices 
are
30 
                                                 
28 For  i = S, R, suppose the banker chooses project i. His payoffs for absconding and not absconding are b – F 
and Xi – 1 + k – cM, respectively. Because Xi – 1 + k – cM > 0 > b – F, the banker will not abscond in this case. 
29  Because it is costly to acquire s, the investor will acquire s only if his decision on whether to buy the debt is 
contingent on s. Since the bank’s project is more likely to succeed when s = H, the investor will buy the debt 
only when s = H if he acquires s. 
30 In  (11),  pj q +(1 – pj)(1 – q) is the probability of s = H, and pj q is the probability of s = H and the bank’s 
project will succeed. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the investor’s required rate of return for the 
money he spends on acquiring s is zero. If the investor requires a positive rate of return rI on the information   23
pj D – (1 + rSD)  α,                                               ( 1 0 )  
I SD j j j c r q p q p D q p − + − − + − α ) 1 ( )] 1 )( 1 ( [ ,                             ( 1 1 )  
and  0, respectively. The investor will choose the one with the highest payoff. Without loss of 
generality, we assume that the investor will buy the debt if he is indifferent between buying and not 
buying. Also, given that he will buy the debt, he will not acquire s if he is indifferent between 
acquiring and not acquiring s. For j = S, R, define 
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The following proposition states the investor’s choice. 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose the investor offered to buy the subdebt believes that the banker chooses 
project j. The investor’s decisions can be described as follows. 
(a)  In case α < j α , the investor will buy the debt without acquiring s if D ≥ (1 + rSD) α / pj, and will 
neither acquire s nor buy the debt if D < (1 + rSD) α / pj. 
(b)  In case α ≥ j α , the investor will 
(i)  buy the debt without acquiring s if D ≥ j D ; 
(ii) acquire s and buy the debt only when s = H if  j D ≤ D < j D ; 
(iii)  neither  acquire  s nor buy the debt if D < j D .  
                                                                                                                                                          
acquisition cost, then cI in all the equations should be replaced by (1 + rI) cI.   24
(c)   S α > R α . Moreover, if α ≥ S α , then  R D > S D  and  R D > S D .   
 
Proposition 2 suggests that to induce the investor to acquire s, D should not be too high or too low. 
By (10) and (11), if D is sufficiently high, the return from buying the debt is so large that the investor 
will buy the debt without bothering to acquire s. If D is too low, the return from investing in subdebt is 
too low, so the investor will neither acquire s nor buy the debt. The proposition also says that α has to 
be high enough in order to induce the investor to acquire the signal. If α is low, the investor’s gain 
from monitoring will not be large enough to cover the information acquisition cost cI. Finally, from 
part (c) of the proposition, the riskier is the project, the less attractive is the subdebt to the investor, so 
it takes a higher D to induce the investor to acquire s or to buy the debt without acquiring s.   
Among the cases discussed in Proposition 2, we are especially interested in case (ii) in part (b), 
where the investor acquires s, and buys the debt only if s = H. We will say that the investor monitors if 
he does so. We assume it is always possible to induce monitoring by the investor, that is, 
α  ≥  S α .                                                          ( 1 5 )  
  We next consider the banker’s choices of the project and D. Suppose all the investors believe that 
the banker chooses project j, and the banker chooses project i. According to the investor’s decision 
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where
31,32,33 
                                                 
31  Equation (17) can be explained as follows. When the investor does not monitor, the bank pays 1 – k – α 
dollars to depositors and D dollars to the subdebt investor at date 2 if its project succeeds, and the banker 
absconds if the project fails. Before deducting the cost of bank capital, the banker’s payoffs in these two   25
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In the above equations, ΠNM, ΠM, and ΠEX are the banker’s payoffs when the investor buys the subdebt 
without monitoring, monitors, and does not buy the subdebt, respectively. By equations (17) and (18), 
the banker’s payoff is strictly decreasing in D if the investor may buy the subdebt. Therefore, the 
banker will set D equal to either  j D  or  j D   if he wants to induce the investor to buy the debt. 
By (16), one choice for the banker is to set D lower than  j D , so that the investor refuses to buy 
the subdebt and the bank is examined by the regulator. Since it is unlikely that any bank would enjoy a 
regulatory examination in the real world, we assume 
cM >  R D  – α                                                    ( 2 0 )  
to exclude this uninteresting case. By (18), (19) and the fact that  R D > S D , when (20) holds, setting 
D lower than  j D   is strictly dominated by setting D = j D   to induce monitoring by the investor.
34 
Even if subdebt regulation is imposed, the banker can avoid monitoring by the subdebt investor 
by setting D equal to  j D  to induce the investor to buy the debt without monitoring. We may say 
                                                                                                                                                          
situations are Xi – (1 – k – α) – D and b – F, respectively. 
32 Equation (18) can be explained as follows. Suppose that the investor monitors. (i) If the bank’s project 
succeeds and s = H, the bank pays 1 – k – α + D at date 2. (ii) If the project fails and s = H, the banker absconds. 
(iii) If the project succeeds and s = L, the bank is examined. In this case, the reopened bank pays 1 – k dollars to 
depositors at date 2, but the cash flow realized becomes Xi – cM. (iv) If the project fails and s = L, the bank is 
examined and is taken over. The probabilities of the four events are pi q, (1 – pi)(1 – q), pi (1 – q), and (1 – pi) q, 
respectively. 
33 If the bank is examined and its project succeeds, the project yields Xi – cM, and the bank has to pay 1 – k to 
depositors. If the project fails, the banker loses franchise value F. From these facts, we have equation (19). 
34  Compared with the case where D = j D , the only benefit for the banker to set D < j D   is that the bank need not 
issue subdebt at date 1 if its project will succeed. If (20) holds, the value destroyed by the examination (cM) 
exceeds the benefit ( j D – α), so the banker has no incentive to always trigger the examination.   26
that the bank can bribe the investor not to monitor by offering him a high interest rate on the subdebt. 
By (17) and (18), the banker has stronger incentives to do so when b is high, that is, his gain from 
taking the value-destroying action is attractive. Also, the banker may want to choose project R rather 
than project S. As shown in the following proposition, a cap on D can help remove these unwanted 
outcomes. By imposing an appropriate cap on D, the government can eliminate all the equilibria 
except those in which the subdebt investor monitors and the banker chooses the safe project. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that the bank is set up at date 0, and the government imposes both capital 
regulation and subdebt regulation. Moreover, it requires that D < min{ S D , R D }.  
(a)  There is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the banker undertakes project R or the investor 
does not monitor. 
(b) If 
k  ≥ k SD  ≡ max{0, k1 – [q b – q ( S D –  α) – (1 – q) cM]},            (21) 
the only Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game is the one in which the banker chooses project S 
and sets D = S D , and the investor offered to buy the subdebt monitors. 
 
Proposition 3 states that the banker will choose the safe project and the investor will monitor if 
subdebt regulation is imposed and (21) is satisfied.
35 The proposition can be explained as follows. 
Because  S D < R D , requiring D to be lower than  S D  makes it impossible to have an equilibrium in 
which the investor buys the debt without monitoring. Also, requiring D lower than  R D  makes it 
impossible to have an equilibrium in which the banker undertakes project R. Therefore, given the cap 
on D specified in the proposition, the only equilibrium candidates remained are those in which the 
                                                 
35  Since both players are rational, they can figure out the equilibrium and they will choose their equilibrium 
strategies. The subdebt investor will form his belief about the banker’s project choice according to the 
equilibrium.   27
banker chooses project S and the investor monitors. Intuitively, the banker must set D sufficiently high 
to induce the investor to buy the subdebt without monitoring. Also, the required interest rate on 
subdebt must be higher if the investor knows that the banker pursues project R. By setting a ceiling on 
the interest rate of subdebt, the government can eliminate the equilibria in which the disciplining 
effects of subdebt regulation are substantially weakened. 
In the literature, Calomiris (1997, 1999) suggest that there should be interest rate caps on 
subdebts. Proposition 3 provides a justification for these proposals. Blum (2002) worries that interest 
rate caps on subdebt may eliminate the investors’ incentives to acquire information. In contrast to 
Blum’s view, we show that interest rate caps may be necessary for inducing investors to acquire 
information about the issuing banks. 
  Proposition 3 also shows kSD, the minimum amount of bank capital needed to induce the banker 
to choose the safe project when subdebt regulation is imposed. Compared with the case where only 
capital regulation is used, the subdebt requirement has three effects on the banker’s risk-taking 
incentives. First, when the project will fail and s = L, the requirement induces a regulatory 
examination on the bank, thus stops the banker from absconding. Second, when the project will 
succeed and s = H, the requirement increases the bank’s debt burden by  S D – α. Finally, when the 
bank’s project will succeed and s = L, the examination reduces the bank’s profit by cM. 
These three effects are expressed in the first, second, and third terms in the square 
bracket of (21), respectively. The first effect lowers the banker’s incentives to pursue risk, 
while the other two increase his risk-taking incentives. If the first effect is significant enough 
so that 
q b – q ( S D – α) – (1 – q) cM > 0, 
then kSD < k1. In other words, subdebt regulation may allow the government to lower the bank 
capital requirement. Note that by (21), the first effect is more significant when b, the amount   28
of money the banker can steal from the bank, is higher. Intuitively, managers of weak banks 
have more opportunities to take value-destroying actions before the banks are closed if 
regulatory forbearance is common in the banking industry, and/or if capital ratios cannot 
timely reflect the true financial health of banks. Proposition 3 implies that subdebt regulation 
is more likely to be valuable in these cases. 
In the literature, Blum (2002) considers only the second effect stated above, so he 
concludes that subdebt regulation will increase rather than decrease banks’ incentives to 
pursue risk. Proposition 3 implies that Blum’s result may no longer hold if subdebt regulation 
has the merit of reducing the probability that banker can take value-destroying actions in the 
downturn. 
 
5. Welfare Effects of Subdebt Regulation 
In this section, we discuss whether imposing subdebt regulation can improve social 
welfare. Suppose that the government can raise funds at the risk-free interest rate and deposit 
insurance incurs no welfare losses. Given that both bank capital and subdebt regulations are 
imposed, social welfare can be written as 
WSD ≡ pS XS + (1 – pS) (Y – F) – 1 – kSD rk – { [pS (1 – q)+(1 – pS)q] cM + 
[pS q + (1 – pS)(1 – q)] α rSD + (1 – pS)(1 – q)(Y – b) + cI }.            ( 2 2 )  
In equation (22), pS XS + (1 – pS) (Y – F) – 1 is the net present value of project S assuming 
that it is fully financed by deposits, and kSD rk is the cost of bank capital. The terms in the 
braces are the costs incurred when subdebt regulation is imposed.
36 
                                                 
36  In equation (22), [pS (1 – q)+(1 – pS)q] cM is the expected project value destroyed by the examination, [pS q + 
(1 – pS)(1 – q)] α rSD is the return required by the subdebt investor (which is α rSD) multiplied by the probability   29
  An interesting observation from (22) is that WSD is decreasing in α. In our model, an 
increase in α reduces welfare in two ways. First, investors require a higher rate of return on 
subdebt than on deposits. Second, an increase in α escalates the bank’s debt burden, thus 
raises kSD. If α can be endogenously determined, the government should keep reducing it as 
long as subdebt regulation still motivates the investor to monitor. By (15), the optimal α for 
the government is  S α .
37 
  To see whether subdebt regulation can improve welfare, consider the case where the 
government will set k equal to k1 if subdebt regulation is not implemented. The following 
proposition identifies the condition under which subdebt regulation can improve welfare in 
this case. 
 
Proposition 4. Suppose that Πk(S, k2) < 0 or (8) does not hold, so the government will set k 
equal to k1 if subdebt regulation is not imposed. Moreover, ΠM(S, S D , kSD) ≥ 0. In this case, 
subdebt regulation improves social welfare if and only if 
cI + [pS (1 – q)+(1 – pS)q] cM +[pS q + (1 – pS)(1 – q)] α rSD < 
(k1 – kSD) rk + (1 – pS) q (Y – b).                            ( 2 3 )  
 
In equation (23), the left-hand-side items are the costs of subdebt regulation, while the 
right-hand-side ones are the benefits. When subdebt regulation is implemented, an investor 
                                                                                                                                                          
that the subdebt is issued (which is [pS q + (1 – pS)(1 – q)]), (1 – pS)(1 – q)(Y – b) is the expected social loss 
caused by the banker’s absconding, and cI is the information acquisition cost for the investor. Note that the loss 
of the bank’s franchise value F has been considered when we calculate the present value of project S. 
37  Technically, the government has to set α slightly higher than  S α . If α = S α , by (12) to (14),  S D = S D , which 
implies the government may be unable to use the cap on D to eliminate the unwanted equilibria in which the 
banker sets D = S D   to avoid monitoring.   30
spends cI to acquire signal s, project value will be reduced by cM if the investor refuses to buy 
the debt, and the investor requires a higher rate of return on subdebt than on deposits. On the 
other hand, subdebt regulation may bring two benefits. First, if kSD < k1, the regulation lowers 
the amount of bank capital needed to induce the banker to choose project S by k1 – kSD. 
Second, the regulation reduces the probability that the banker will abscond by (1 – pS) q. 
Subdebt regulation can be justified if (23) holds, that is, its benefits outweigh the costs.   
  The following numerical example demonstrates a case in which subdebt regulation is 
welfare improving. Assume that pS = 0.9, XS = 1.1933, pR = 0.5, XR = 1.54, Y = 0.26, b = 
0.08, rk = 0.18, rSD = 0.08, F = 0.25, q = 0.85, cI = 0.001, and α = S α . It can be shown that 
all the constraints of the model are satisfied if 0.0306 < cM < 0.2633.
38  In this case, k1 = 0.07, 
k2 = 0.57,  S α = 0.0132, Πk(S, k1) > 0, W1(k1) > 0, and Πk(S, k2) < 0. Moreover, when 0.0306 
< cM < 0.1012, subdebt regulation not only reduces the required bank capital for inducing the 
banker to choose project S (that is, kSD < k1), but also improves social welfare. 
Proposition 4 suggests that imposing subdebt regulation may still improve welfare even 
if bank capital regulation has already been in place. Although both capital and subdebt are 
junior to deposits and both are costly funding sources, the two regulations are different in 
nature. While capital regulation forces shareholders of banks to behave themselves, subdebt 
regulation encourages outsiders who cannot share the upside gains of the banks’ risk-taking to 
monitor banks. In fact, the two regulations can be complements. Suppose that 0 < kSD < k1, 
and the government will set k = k1 if subdebt regulation is not imposed. In this case, using 
capital regulation to deter the banker from taking value-destroying actions is either too costly 
                                                 
38  These constraints include (1), (3), (9), (15), (20), 0 < b < Y, 0 < α < 1 – k, Y < 1 – k – α, and XS ≥ Max{1 – 
k – α + D, 1 – k + cM}. 
   31
or infeasible. Subdebt regulation not only helps alleviate the banker’s value-destroying 
problem, it also reduces the bank capital to choose the right project. Therefore, 
complementing bank capital regulation, subdebt regulation can be an effective mechanism for 
disciplining banks. 
  In the above discussion, we focus on the case where the government will set k = k1 if 
subdebt regulation is not imposed. If the government will set k = k2 without subdebt 
regulation, the regulation can still improve welfare if k2 – kSD, the reduction in capital 
requirement caused by subdebt regulation, is sufficiently high. 
 
6. Discussions 
This section studies two issues related to subdebt regulation. Section 6.1 discusses 
practical concerns for implementing subdebt regulation. It investigates how collusion between 
the banker and the subdebt investor and the possibility that the government may bail out the 
subdebt investor will affect the effectiveness of subdebt regulation. It also briefly discusses 
possible ways to set the interest rate ceilings of subdebt. Section 6.2 introduces proposals that 
require banks to issue contingent capital certificates. As will be explained, to prevent the 
government from bailing out subdebt investors, we propose that subdebt should convert into 
the issuing bank’s common stock if the government takes over or provides open assistance to 
the bank. Because of this conversion feature, our proposal is also a contingent capital proposal, 
and it shares important common features with other contingent capital proposals. 
 
6.1. Practical concerns for implementing the subdebt regulation 
  In Section 2, we assume that the banker and the subdebt investor cannot collude, and that   32
the government cannot bail out the subdebt investor. This subsection studies the cases in 
which these assumptions are relaxed. First consider the collusion between the banker and the 
subdebt investor. Suppose that the banker is allowed to invest in the subdebt issued by the 
bank.
39 Also, at date 1 the banker receives perfect information about the date-2 cash flow of 
the bank’s project before he decides whether to buy the subdebt. All the other assumptions in 
Section 2 remain the same. 
  Under this setting, outside investors will not buy the subdebt due to the information 
disadvantage they face: the banker would offer the subdebt to an outside investor only when 
the return from investing in the debt is negative. If the return is positive, the banker would 
buy the debt himself. Since the only investor that may buy the subdebt is the banker himself, 
the function of subdebt in this case becomes similar to that of bank capital. This point is 
illustrated in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5. Suppose that the banker establishes the bank at date 0, and both bank capital 
and subdebt regulations are imposed. The banker is allowed to invest in the subdebt, and he 
perfectly learns the date-2 cash flow of the bank’s project when deciding whether to buy the 










< <α . 
(a)  The banker always buys the subdebt at date 1. 
(b)  (i)  If k + α < k1, the banker chooses project R, and he absconds with money when the 
project fails. 
                                                 
39  When the banker and the subdebt investor collude, they maximize their joint welfare. The simplest way to 
model this situation is to assume that the banker himself is the investor. Therefore, we assume that the banker 
can buy the subdebt.   33
(ii)  If k1 ≤ k + α < k2, the banker chooses project S, and he absconds with money when 
the project fails. 
(iii)  If k + α ≥ k2, the banker chooses project S, and he injects funds into the bank when 
the project fails. 
 
Proposition 5 discusses the case where α is not high.
40 Part (a) of the proposition states 
that the banker will always buy the subdebt in this case. From this result, subdebt becomes a 
sure funding source for the bank. If the bank’s project will succeed, the banker buys the debt 
to avoid the costly regulatory examination. If the bank’s project will fail, the banker buys the 
debt to preserve the opportunity to abscond. By part (b) of the proposition, α and k have the 
same impacts on the banker’s behavior. Note that part (b) of the proposition would become 
equivalent to Proposition 1 if we replace all the k + α by k. Therefore, in case the banker and 
subdebt investors can collude, the subdebt requirement serves the same function as bank 
capital regulation if α is not high. 
From the above discussions, if the purpose of subdebt regulation is to induce outside 
investors to monitor banks, banks and subdebt investors should not be allowed to collude. 
That is, parties closely related to a bank should be banned from buying the bank’s subdebt. 
                                                 
40 The  condition  α < b / (1 + rSD) implies that α is not high enough to deter the banker from absconding. To see 
this, suppose that the condition does not hold, so α (1+rSD) > b. When the bank’s project will fail, the benefit for 
the banker from absconding (which is b) is less than the cost to invest in the subdebt (which is (1 + rSD) α), so 
the banker will not buy the debt and the bank will be examined. By this result, when the banker and the subdebt 
investor can collude, a sufficiently high subdebt requirement (that is, α > b / (1 + rSD)) can deter the banker from 
taking value destroying actions. We do not discuss this case because we think that the amount of subdebt 
required to deter the banker from absconding may be too high in the real world. The results under the case where 
α > b / (1 + rSD) are available from the authors upon request. The condition α < cM /rSD guarantees that the 
banker will buy the subdebt when the bank’s project will succeed. For the banker, when the project will succeed, 
the net cost for him to invest in the debt is rSD α, and the cost of the regulatory examination is cM. If α < cM / rSD, 
he will invest in the subdebt to avoid the regulatory examination when he learns that the project will succeed.   34
Also, cross-holding of subdebts between banks should be prohibited. Banks will abide by the 
no-collusion rules if the punishments for violating them are serious enough. On the other hand, 
as Proposition 5 shows, even if banks and subdebt investors can get around the no-collusion 
rules, subdebt regulation still has the function of bank capital regulation. 
  Next consider how a possible government bailout of the subdebt investor will affect the 
results. Suppose it is common knowledge that the government will bail out the subdebt 
investor with probability β when the bank’s project fails, where β is a constant with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. 
The subdebt investor receives the full amount of D at date 2 when he is bailed out. All the 
other assumptions in Section 2 hold. The following proposition demonstrates that it becomes 
more difficult to induce the subdebt investor to monitor when the probability of a bailout is 
higher. 
 
Proposition 6. Suppose that the government bails out the subdebt investor at date 2 with 
probability β when the bank’s project fails. 
(a) For  i = S, B, if the subdebt investor believes that the banker chooses project i, the  
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(b) ) ( ˆ β αi   is increasing in β, and approaches infinity when β approaches 1. 
 
The results in Proposition 6 are intuitive. As β increases, buying the debt without 
acquiring s becomes more attractive than monitoring to the investor. Hence, α must become 
larger to induce him to monitor. By part (b) of the proposition, when β is sufficiently high, the   35
minimum α that can induce the investor to monitor can far exceed the value of the bank’s 
assets, which will make subdebt regulation infeasible. Proposition 6 implies that the 
effectiveness of subdebt regulation will be hampered if the government bails out subdebt 
investors too frequently. 
To alleviate the problem that government bailouts may compromise the subdebt investors’ 
incentives to monitor, we propose that subdebts issued to satisfy the subdebt requirement 
should have the following conversion feature: the subdebt will automatically convert into the 
issuing bank’s common stock at a predetermined conversion price if the government takes 
over or provides open assistance to the bank. The conversion price is set high so that subdebt 
investors will suffer losses when conversion occurs. The government will have no incentive to 
go against the conversion to save subdebt investors because the conversion alleviates the 
bank’s debt burden. In this way, the subdebt holders of a financially distressed bank will be 
punished even if the government bails out other creditors.
41 The fear of this punishment will 
induce subdebt holders to monitor banks. This conversion feature is not a new idea. Similar 
suggestions have been studied in other proposals. Please see Section 6.2 for more discussion. 
Adding the conversion feature to subdebt does not change the results in our model. 
Because the bank’s project has only two possible outcomes and the money left at the bank is 
insufficient to pay off the depositors when the bank’s project fails, the value of the subdebt 
holder’s converted shares is always zero at any positive conversion price.
42 As a result, the 
                                                 
41  We implicitly assume that in a bank bailout, the government saves only the creditors, but not the shareholders 
of the bank. This assumption is reasonable. For example, according to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(1989), when the FDIC bailed out the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company in 1984, the 
interests of its shareholders were eliminated. 
42 According the definition of the conversion feature stated in the paper, conversion will occur at date 2 if the 
bank’s project fails and the government decides to bail out the bank. In this case, depositors are bailed out, while 
the banker and the subdebt investor are not.   36
players’ payoffs in all the cases will not be affected by the conversion feature. However, if the 
model is modified so that the outcome of the bank’s project becomes continuous, the value of 
the subdebt investor’s converted shares will be positive if the government bails out the bank 
before the bank’s equity value becomes negative. In this case, the conversion value of subdebt 
matters because it affects the investor’s payoffs in bad states. When the conversion value is 
higher (that is, when the conversion price is lower), the investor’s payoffs in bad states are 
higher, so he will require a lower yield on subdebt. This will make it easier for the bank to 
keep the subdebt yield below the interest rate ceiling. On the other hand, by reducing the 
punishment against the subdebt investor in bad states, a higher conversion value worsens the 
investor’s incentives to monitor. Therefore, when the conversion value becomes higher, the 
government may have to raise the required amount of subdebt issued (that is, α) or lower the 
interest rate ceiling to increase the investor’s monitoring incentives. The optimal conversion 
value of subdebt will depend on the tradeoff between these two effects.
43 
  Finally, we briefly discuss how to determine the interest rate caps of subdebt. As shown 
in Section 4, the level of the interest rate cap must be adequate: the banker can induce the 
investor to buy the debt without monitoring if the cap is too high, and no investor will buy the 
debt if the cap is too low. In the literature, there have been some discussions on this issue. 
Several papers, including Calomiris (1999) and Evanoff and Wall (2001), propose that the 
yields on corporate bonds of a certain rating (such as BBB) are good candidates for the 
interest rate caps. The caps determined by this principle not only can timely reflect the 
changes in bond markets, but also may reduce the pro-cyclical problem of bank regulation 
                                                 
43 That is, the conversion value should be higher if it is more important to make issuing subdebt a feasible 
choice for the bank, and should be lower if it is more important to preserve the investor’s incentives to monitor.   37
because the risk premiums on corporate bonds of a certain rating are likely to be higher during 
recessions and lower during economic booms.
44 Also, the empirical results in Evanoff and 
Jagtiani (2004) suggest that subdebt regulation will be more effective if the corporate bonds 
used to set the caps have similar maturities with the subdebts. These papers provide an 
insightful guide for designing reasonable interest rate caps of subdebt. 
 
6.2. Contingent capital certificates 
  Contingent capital certificates (CCCs thereafter) have recently been advocated as an 
important tool to alleviate the too-big-to-fail problem in the banking industry. For an issuing 
bank, CCCs are debt obligations when issued, and will convert into the bank’s common stock 
if the bank’s capital ratio falls below a predetermined value.
45 Take the proposal in Flannery 
(2009) for example. Flannery suggests that one alternative for a large financial firm to satisfy 
the capital requirement is to keep the market value of its common shares no lower than 4 
percent of total assets if the firm has sufficient outstanding CCC. The face value of the CCC 
must be at least 4 percent of total assets, and the CCC will convert on the day after the market 
value of the firm’s common shares falls below 4 percent of total assets. In addition, the 
conversion price is designed in a way that the market value of the shares that holders of the 
                                                 
44  For more discussion on this point, see Evanoff and Wall (2001). 
45  There has not been a consensus on the main features of the CCC requirement. The issues under debate include 
whether the conversion triggers should be market-based or accounting-based measures, whether a systemic index 
that reflects the financial conditions of the whole banking industry should be included as a conversion trigger, 
whether the conversion price should be a premium price or a discounted price, and how to alleviate the potential 
stock price manipulation problem. For more discussion, see Albul, Jaffee, and Tchistyi (2010), Acharya et al. 
(2009), Duffee (2009), Flannery (2005, 2009), Hart and Zingales (2009), McDonald (2010), Pennacchi (2010), 
Strongin, Hindlian, and Lawson (2009), Sundaresan and Wang (2010), and Squam Lake Working Group on 
Financial Regulation (2009).   38
CCC receive is equal to the face value of the CCC on the day of the conversion.
46 
  Requiring banks to issue CCCs has several merits. It lowers the issuing banks’ 
bankruptcy probabilities if the conversions of CCCs into shares occur before banks become 
bankrupt. Also, by increasing the banks’ risk-absorption capacities, the CCC requirement 
lowers the government’s need to bail out banks as well as the amount of money the 
government has to inject into bailed-out banks. In addition, it implements market discipline 
by punishing bank shareholders whose banks are in weak financial conditions: their shares are 
diluted when CCCs are converted, and the implicit subsidy from government bailouts is 
substantially reduced. Another advantage of the CCC requirement is that issuing banks need 
not pay high interest rates on CCC bonds if the bonds are properly designed. A CCC bond is 
not risky if conversion always occurs before the issuing bank becomes financially distressed 
and the market value of the converted shares is no less than the bond’s face value. 
  Because of the conversion feature we impose in Section 6.1, the subdebt regulation 
proposed in this paper is also a contingent capital proposal. As in other CCC proposals, the 
conversion feature of subdebt prevents the government from bailing out the creditors of 
distressed banks at the expense of taxpayers and enhances market discipline. The additional 
merit of the conversion feature in our proposal is that it preserves the subdebt investors’ 
incentives to monitor banks, and monitoring by investors will generate valuable information 
for bank supervision. This implies that, if well designed, the CCC requirement may also play 
a positive role for enforcing prompt corrective actions in the banking industry.
47 
                                                 
46  See pages 9 to 10 in Flannery (2009). 
47  In the real world, banks’ asset values may suddenly drop significantly. Therefore, CCC bonds may still be 
risky because the market values of the converted shares may fall below the face values of the bonds. When 
CCCs are not risk-free, it is possible for them to play the role of subdebt in the subdebt regulation we propose.   39
   
7. Concluding Remarks 
  In this paper, we demonstrate that subdebt regulation may reduce bank risk and improve 
social welfare. There are several directions to extend our model. One is to consider the case 
where bank managers do not maximize welfare of bank shareholders. In our paper, we assume 
that the banker owns and manages the bank. As Saunders et al. (1990) and Gorton and Rosen 
(1995) point out, the interests of bank managers may diverge from those of bank shareholders, 
and this divergence has important implications on the banks’ moral hazard problems. It will 
be interesting to see how effective bank capital and subdebt regulations are in this case. 
Another direction of extending the model is to investigate the case where bank risk is 
observable, so banks with higher asset risk have to pay higher interest rates on subdebt. This 
extension will allow us to learn more about the direct discipline effect of subdebt regulation. 
Finally, we can consider other regulatory mechanisms in our model. For example, Goyal 
(2005) shows that restrictive covenants in bank debts play an important role on mitigating 
bank risk taking. Esty (1998) suggests that imposing contingent liability on bank shareholders 
can reduce bank risk. Studying how these mechanisms affect the behavior of both bank 
managers and subdebt investors will be a promising topic for future study. 
                                                                                                                                                          
That is, regulators will examine banks that are unable to successfully issue CCCs, and will take corrective 
actions against a bank if the examination reveals that it is in a poor financial condition.   40
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
As discussed in the text, if the bank’s project fails, the banker will inject wealth to pay 
off the deposits if k ≥ k2, and will abscond otherwise. First consider the case where k < k2. In 
this case, the banker will choose project S at date 0 if and only if 
pS [XS – (1 – k)] + (1 – pS) (b – F) ≥ pR [XR – (1 – k)] + (1 – pR) (b – F), 
or equivalently k ≥ k1. Because G > Y, we know that k1 < k2. 
  Now consider the case where k ≥ k2. In this case, the banker will choose project S if and 
only if 
pS [XS – (1 – k)] + (1 – pS) [Y – (1 – k)] ≥ pR [XR – (1 – k)] + (1 – pR) [Y – (1 – k)], 
or equivalently, G ≥ Y, which always holds. Therefore, the banker always chooses project S if 
k ≥ k2. This completes the proof of the proposition.        Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of the Lemma. 
By (7), Wk(k2) ≥ Wk(k1) if and only if (8) holds. Therefore, if Πk(S, k2) ≥ 0 and (8) holds, 
the government should set k = k2. Otherwise, it should set k = k1.    Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.  
For j = S, R, define D0j ≡ (1 + rSD) α / pj. From the investor’s payoffs for choosing the 
three alternatives, he will buy the debt without monitoring if D ≥ max{ j D , D0j}, will monitor 
if  j D ≤ D < j D , and will neither acquire s nor buy the debt if D < min{ j D , D0j}. It can be 
easily shown that if α ≥ j α , then  j D ≥ D0j ≥ j D . If α < j α , then  j D < D0j < j D . Using these 
facts, we can easily prove parts (a) and (b) of the proposition. For part (c), because pS > pR, it 
is obvious that  S α > R α  by (12). Also, given pS > pR, by (13) and (14) it can be easily 
verified that  R D > S D  and  R D > S D  if  α > S α .       Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
For part (a), if the banker undertakes project R in equilibrium, the equilibrium D is either   41
R D  or  R D . If the banker induces the investor not to monitor, the equilibrium D is either  R D  
or  S D . Therefore, under the requirement that D < min{ S D , R D }, there is no perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium in which the investor chooses project R or buys the subdebt without monitoring. 
For part (b), suppose that the investor believes that the banker will choose project S. Because 
of the cap on D, the banker cannot induce the investor to buy the debt without monitoring. 
Therefore, the banker will choose project S and set D = S D  if and only if ΠM(S, S D , k) ≥ 
ΠM(R, S D , k), which is equivalent to (21). From these results, if subdebt regulation is imposed 
and (21) is satisfied, the only Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the one in which the banker 
chooses project S and the investor monitors. This completes the proof of the proposition.     
Q.E.D.  
 
Proof of Proposition 4.  
It can be easily shown that WSD ≥ Wk(k1) if and only if (23) holds. This completes the 
proof  of  the  proposition.      Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5. 
Suppose that the banker is allowed to invest in the subdebt. As explained in the paper, he 
will be the only one who may buy the debt. First consider the case where he learns that the 
bank’s project will succeed. Given α < cM / rSD, the banker will buy the subdebt to save the 
cost of the regulatory examination because cM > α r SD. Next consider the case where the 
banker learns that the bank’s project will fail. In this case, he has three choices. Without 
considering the sunk cost (1 + rk) k, his payoff is Y – (1 – k – α) – (1 + rSD) α if he buys the 
debt and injects funds into the bank, is b – F – (1 + rSD) α if he buys the debt and absconds 






α , not buying the subdebt 
is strictly dominated by buying the debt and absconding. Therefore, the banker will always 










< <α . This proves part (a) of the proposition. 
When the bank’s project fails, injecting funds into the bank is better than absconding for   42
the banker if and only if Y – (1 – k – α) ≥ b – F, or equivalently, k + α ≥ k2. Obviously, the 
banker will choose project S if he injects funds to the bank when the bank’s project fails 
because he internalizes all the costs in this case. This proves part (b)(iii) of the proposition. 
Finally, given the above discussions, for i = S, B, when k + α < k2, the banker’s payoff 
for choosing project i is pi [Xi – (1 – k – α) – D + D] + (1 – pi) (b – F) – (1 + rk) k – (1 + rSD) 
α. It can be easily shown that he will choose project S if k + α ≥ k1 and will choose project R 
otherwise. This completes the proof of the proposition.          Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6. 
As in Section 4, in this case the investor offered to buy the subdebt has three choices: (i) 
buy the debt without acquiring s, (ii) neither acquire s nor buy the debt, and (iii) acquire s and 
buy the debt if and only if s = H. His payoffs for these three alternatives are   
[pi+ (1 – pi) β] D – (1 + rSD) α, 
0, and 
I SD i i i i c r q p q p D q p q p − + − − + − − − + α β ) 1 ( )] 1 )( 1 ( [ ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [,  
respectively. Applying the same logic for proving Proposition 2, it can be easily shown that 
the minimum α for inducing the investor to monitor is  ) ( ˆ β αi . This completes the proof of 
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